Washington is tightening its rules on countries like India and China for continuing to buy Russian oil and gas, arguing that such purchases help finance Moscow’s war in Ukraine. Yet, when American energy security is at stake, the United States has carved out its own exceptions to restrictions on Russian supplies.
Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 ’ by 262 votes to 159. The legislation, which now goes to President Donald Trump, seeks to intensify economic pressure on Russia and gives the president the power to impose tariffs of up to 100% on countries that continue importing Russian energy. The United States banned imports of Russian low-enriched uranium in 2024. The waiver provisions can remain in place until no later than 1 January 2028, according to the The Prohibiting Uranium Imports Act of 2024 signed by then US President Joe Biden. Released on 29th July 2025, American nuclear operators bought 13 million separative work units of enrichment services in 2025, according to the latest data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA). Only 23% came from US enrichment suppliers, while 77% came from foreign suppliers. Russia alone accounted for 26% of the total enrichment services purchased by US nuclear operators, making it the largest single foreign source. France supplied 18%, the UK 14% and the Netherlands 8%. But Washington now backs legislation that could impose tariffs of up to 100% on countries such as India that keep buying Russian energy. In 2025, foreign suppliers accounted for 77% of the enrichment services purchased by US nuclear operators, with Russia alone responsible for 26%. So why are the energy needs of 1.4 billion people sanctioned?
The issue is therefore not simply whether Russia should be sanctioned.
The waiver system is designed to avoid disruption to nuclear reactors while alternative sources are developed, the Department of Energy has said. That contradiction is becoming increasingly difficult to overlook. India and China are among the countries that could be affected. The message from Washington is clear— buying Russian fossil fuels is portrayed as helping sustain Moscow’s war effort, and countries continuing to do so should face economic consequences. But the US itself has not completely cut its dependence on Russian nuclear fuel. However, the legislation included an important waiver mechanism. Under the rules issued by the US Department of Energy, imports of Russian low-enriched uranium can still be permitted if no viable alternative is available to keep a nuclear reactor or American nuclear energy company operating, or if the import is deemed to be in the national interest. In other words, Washington has prohibited Russian nuclear fuel in principle while retaining a legal route to continue receiving it when American energy security requires it. And the dependence is not merely theoretical. That creates an uncomfortable comparison. India has always maintained that the purchase of Russian crude is linked to its energy-security requirements. The legislation is specifically designed to reduce the reliance of countries on Russian oil and gas. At the same time, the US nuclear industry remains heavily dependent on foreign enrichment capacity, including Russian. The difference is that Washington views its own purchases of Russian uranium as a temporary necessity while it builds up alternative supplies. But this explanation also indicates the contradiction. If energy security can justify the United States’ ongoing reliance on Russian nuclear fuel, countries like India can make a similar case for crude oil — particularly when their economies depend on cheap, reliable energy supplies. It is about how those sanctions are applied. The US is asking major Russian energy buyers to rapidly restructure established supply chains, while giving its own nuclear industry time and legal exemptions to make the same transition. The EIA’s figures underline how difficult that transition can be. Washington is investing in expanding domestic enrichment capacity, but the need for a transition period is precisely why the uranium waiver exists. That raises a basic question: if American energy security warrants flexibility when Russian supplies are involved, why should the same principle not apply to countries such as India and China? The US position can be explained as a distinction between temporary nuclear-fuel dependence and continued purchases of Russian fossil fuels. But from the perspective of the countries under US sanctions, the larger principle still applies: energy security often means access to supplies that cannot be replaced overnight. India has already declared its determination to protect its trade and economic interests. So the picture emerging is that two different standards are being used for Russian energy dependence. Washington is increasingly viewing the sale of Russian oil to India and China as something that should carry a serious economic penalty. The United States has already treated dependence on Russian nuclear fuel as a security problem that needs exemptions, transition time and investment of billions of dollars to solve it. The difference is probably legally explainable. But politically and economically, it shows an incredible inconsistency in Washington’s views of Russian energy dependence: what is viewed as unacceptable dependence when others do it is a short-term necessity when American energy security is at stake.
The latest move came on Wednesday, when the US House of Representatives passed the ‘ Lindsey O.
