Iran has used sea mines in the waterway before, and the episode in 1987 showed how a relatively small number of mines could complicate the plans of a much larger naval force. New Delhi: The Strait of Hormuz has become a major test for naval forces trying to keep commercial shipping moving through one of the world’s most important oil routes.
The best-known incident came on July 24, 1987, during the Operation Earnest Will, when the US Navy was escorting reflagged Kuwaiti tankers through the Persian Gulf. The same threat has returned in 2026. The weapons were identified as the Iranian-made Maham 3 and Maham 7. The United Kingdom has announced £115 million for mine-hunting drones and counter-drone systems as part of an international effort involving more than 40 countries. The 1987 Bridgeton incident offered a clear example of the challenge. In 2026, the United States and its partners have more advanced tools for finding and removing mines.
Because they did not want to risk hitting another mine, the US warships escorting the tanker then followed behind it through the area. The ongoing mine threat therefore has a direct connection with what happened nearly four decades ago. The operation was launched after Kuwait asked Washington to protect its tankers during the Iran-Iraq War.
US officials told CBS News in March that American intelligence assessments had identified at least a dozen Iranian mines in the Strait of Hormuz. One of the tankers, the huge Bridgeton, struck an Iranian mine near Farsi Island (a small island in the Persian Gulf). The explosion damaged its hull, but the ship kept moving and continued towards Kuwait. The US Naval History and Heritage Command describes the incident as a moment that exposed the difficulties the Navy faced in dealing with Iranian mine warfare. Iran had laid a line of mines across the deep-water channel used by large ships. US intelligence had noticed unusual Iranian activity near the Farsi Island, but it did not identify the mine-laying operation in time. The incident forced Washington to bring additional mine-warfare equipment into the Gulf. Another US official put the number at fewer than a dozen. Britain has also taken part in efforts to keep the Strait open. The technology has changed, but the basic military problem is familiar. A navy can have advanced warships, aircraft and missiles and still face a slow and dangerous task when an adversary places explosives in a narrow shipping route. The US convoy had several warships providing protection, but the tanker still hit a mine that the escorts had not detected. The US Navy then had to bring dedicated mine-warfare assets into the region. The challenge is still time, detection and uncertainty over the location of every device. Iran does not need a navy as large as the US Navy to make the Strait of Hormuz difficult to use. A minefield, even a limited one, can force a much larger naval force to slow down and spend considerable resources clearing a safe route. That is why the threat in Hormuz continues to be important for military planners and oil markets around the world.
The Maham 3 is a moored mine that uses acoustic and magnetic sensors to detect ships without requiring direct contact. The Maham 7 is built to sit on the seabed and also uses acoustic and magnetic sensors. The Maham 3 is used in deeper water, while the Maham 7 is meant for shallower areas and can be difficult to distinguish from the seabed. In September 2025, the last Avenger-class mine countermeasure ship based in the Middle East was decommissioned.
Its design can make sonar detection more difficult. The numbers involved are small compared with the scale of the waterway. The problem comes from the time and effort needed to find and remove even a limited number of mines. Commercial ships can be forced to slow down, change routes or wait for naval clearance when there is uncertainty over where mines may be located. That has affected shipping through Hormuz. The Strait carries a large share of the world’s oil and gas trade, making any disruption important for energy markets and countries that depend on Gulf supplies. Mine warfare creates a different problem from missile or aircraft attacks. A mine can lie underwater for long periods and does not need a crew to operate once it has been placed. Modern mines such as the Maham series can also use the sound and magnetic signature of a passing ship. The United States has been changing the way it handles mine warfare in the Gulf. The Navy had started replacing the older ships with Littoral Combat Ships fitted with mine-countermeasure mission packages. That transition has left the United States relying more on newer systems, including unmanned equipment, helicopters and specialised mine-hunting technology.
